Washington: Barack Obama, who is generally regarded as a gifted orator, would do well to find time to unwind before he delivers the speech of his lifetime to the Democratic party’s convention next week.
A new analysis of Obama’s voice patterns and the delivery of his speeches made available to and reported in the London-based Guardian, found the Democratic candidate somewhat restricted in his range of facial expression.
Specifically, Obama’s face is locked in an almost permanent attitude of anxiety, with his forehead muscles contracted.
“In all topics Mr Obama displays a similar worried, serious-looking facial pattern. Even when talking about more positive subjects, his facial expressions do not signal positive affective states,” said a report on the analysis, undertaken by the Vox Institute in Geneva for the Clearwater consulting group.
The institute reviewed footage of Obama’s speeches and those of the Republican candidate, John McCain. It relied on footage from four speeches conveying a range of emotions, as well as digitised voice samples, to rate the effectiveness of the two candidates in connecting with voters on the campaign trail.
The habitual worried look is a potential liability for Obama, undermining the image he is trying to project of a confident leader. The image could be disturbing for audiences, said James McBrien, the founder of Clearwater.
It also undercuts Obama’s outward appearance of extreme confidence.
“There is an element of the fact that he is on the edges of his comfort zone here,” McBrien said. “Going into a presidential campaign is not something he has done before, and you could say it is written all over his face.”
Despite that failing, Obama was the clear winner against McCain in the oratorical contest. The result is unsurprising, given that McCain’s own campaign team has gone to some effort to conceal his limitations as a speaker.
McCain has had problems adapting to the Autocue, that staple of public speaking. On the campaign trail he has favoured smaller venues, where he can take questions from audiences, rather than the grand venues and stirring speeches that have become Obama’s signature.
Obama had high scores on six of the eight voice values, including diction, fluency, speed and modulation. His voice could have been a little louder at times, although the study praised his ability to reflect anger, positive emotions and sadness.
The verdict on McCain was harsh. The acoustic analysis noted that the Republican’s voice was pitched slightly high, and that it remained flat, or emotionless, even while he was talking about sad subjects.
McCain’s range of facial expression was just as unvaried. “McCain’s facial repertory is very poor,” the analysis said. “His smile is often not fully developed, ie his cheek-raising muscles do not participate enough in the expression of positive affect [to be perceived as genuine].”
McBrien put it in terms that were even more stark. “He has a poker face,” he said. The problem with the lack of expression, according to McBrien, is that it makes it difficult for an audience to trust the speaker.
The Republican is restricted in his range of motion because of injuries received during the Vietnam war. He tends to keep his hands by his side when he speaks.
The Vox researchers also picked up on one of McCain’s tics. The candidate, who made a campaign slogan of his plainspeaking in the Straight Talk Express, has a habit of completely shutting his eyes and slightly smiling immediately before coming out with one of his signature sarcastic comments.—Dawn/Guardian News Service
Tuesday, August 26, 2008
Time to give Kashmir freedom
On August 15, India celebrated independence from the British Raj. But Kashmiris staged a bandh demanding independence from India. A day symbolising the end of colonialism in India became a day symbolising Indian colonialism in the Valley.
As a liberal, I dislike ruling people against their will. True, nation-building is a difficult and complex exercise, and initial resistance can give way to the integration of regional aspirations into a larger national identity — the end of Tamil secessionism was a classical example of this.
I was once hopeful of Kashmir’s integration, but after six decades of effort, Kashmiri alienation looks greater than ever. India seeks to integrate with Kashmir, not rule it colonially. Yet, the parallels between British rule in India and Indian rule in Kashmir have become too close for my comfort.
Many Indians say that Kashmir legally became an integral part of India when the maharaja of the state signed the instrument of accession. Alas, such legalisms become irrelevant when ground realities change. Indian kings and princes, including the Mughals, acceded to the British Raj. The documents they signed became irrelevant when Indians launched an independence movement.
The British insisted for a long time that India was an integral part of their Empire, the jewel in its crown, and would never be given up. Imperialist Blimps remained in denial for decades. I fear we are in similar denial on Kashmir.
The politically correct story of the maharaja’s accession ignores a devastating parallel event. Just as Kashmir had a Hindu maharaja ruling over a Muslim majority, Junagadh had a Muslim nawab ruling over a Hindu majority. The Hindu maharaja acceded to India, and the Muslim nawab to Pakistan.
But while India claimed that the Kashmiri accession to India was sacred, it did not accept Junagadh’s accession to Pakistan. India sent troops into Junagadh, just as Pakistan sent troops into Kashmir. The difference was that Pakistan lacked the military means to intervene in Junagadh, while India was able to send troops into Srinagar. The Junagadh nawab fled to Pakistan, whereas the Kashmir maharaja sat tight. India’s double standard on Junagadh and Kashmir was breathtaking.
Do you think the people of Junagadh would have integrated with Pakistan after six decades of genuine Pakistani effort? No? Then can you really be confident that Kashmiris will stop demanding freedom and integrate with India?
The British came to India uninvited. By contrast, Sheikh Abdullah, the most popular politician in Kashmir, supported accession to India subject to ratification by a plebiscite. But his heart lay in independence for Kashmir, and he soon began manoeuvering towards that end. He was jailed by Nehru, who then declared Kashmir’s accession was final and no longer required ratification by a plebiscite. The fact that Kashmir had a Muslim majority was held to be irrelevant, since India was a secular country empowering citizens through democracy.
Alas, democracy in Kashmir has been a farce for most of six decades. The rot began with Sheikh Abdullah in 1951: he rejected the nomination papers of almost all opponents, and so won 73 of the 75 seats unopposed! Nehru was complicit in this sabotage of democracy.
Subsequent state elections were also rigged in favour of leaders nominated by New Delhi. Only in 1977 was the first fair election held, and was won by the Sheikh. But he died after a few years, and rigging returned in the 1988 election. That sparked the separatist uprising which continues to gather strength today.
Many Indians point to long episodes of peace in the Valley and say the separatists are just a noisy minority. But the Raj also had long quiet periods between Gandhian agitations, which involved just a few lakhs of India’s 500 million people. One lakh people joined the Quit India movement of 1942, but 25 lakh others joined the British Indian army to fight for the Empire’s glory.
Blimps cited this as evidence that most Indians simply wanted jobs and a decent life. The Raj built the biggest railway and canal networks in the world. It said most Indians were satisfied with economic development, and that independence was demanded by a noisy minority. This is uncomfortably similar to the official Indian response to the Kashmiri demand for freedom.
Let me not exaggerate. Indian rule in Kashmir is not classical colonialism. India has pumped vast sums into Kashmir, not extracted revenue as the Raj did. Kashmir was among the poorest states during the Raj, but now has the lowest poverty rate in India. It enjoys wide civil rights that the Raj never gave. Some elections — 1977, 1983 and 2002 — were perfectly fair.
India has sought integration with Kashmir, not colonial rule. But Kashmiris nevertheless demand freedom. And ruling over those who resent it so strongly for so long is quasi-colonialism, regardless of our intentions.
We promised Kashmiris a plebiscite six decades ago. Let us hold one now, and give them three choices: independence, union with Pakistan, and union with India. Almost certainly the Valley will opt for independence. Jammu will opt to stay with India, and probably Ladakh too. Let Kashmiris decide the outcome, not the politicians and armies of India and Pakistan.—The Times of India
By Swaminathan S. Anklesaria Aiyar
As a liberal, I dislike ruling people against their will. True, nation-building is a difficult and complex exercise, and initial resistance can give way to the integration of regional aspirations into a larger national identity — the end of Tamil secessionism was a classical example of this.
I was once hopeful of Kashmir’s integration, but after six decades of effort, Kashmiri alienation looks greater than ever. India seeks to integrate with Kashmir, not rule it colonially. Yet, the parallels between British rule in India and Indian rule in Kashmir have become too close for my comfort.
Many Indians say that Kashmir legally became an integral part of India when the maharaja of the state signed the instrument of accession. Alas, such legalisms become irrelevant when ground realities change. Indian kings and princes, including the Mughals, acceded to the British Raj. The documents they signed became irrelevant when Indians launched an independence movement.
The British insisted for a long time that India was an integral part of their Empire, the jewel in its crown, and would never be given up. Imperialist Blimps remained in denial for decades. I fear we are in similar denial on Kashmir.
The politically correct story of the maharaja’s accession ignores a devastating parallel event. Just as Kashmir had a Hindu maharaja ruling over a Muslim majority, Junagadh had a Muslim nawab ruling over a Hindu majority. The Hindu maharaja acceded to India, and the Muslim nawab to Pakistan.
But while India claimed that the Kashmiri accession to India was sacred, it did not accept Junagadh’s accession to Pakistan. India sent troops into Junagadh, just as Pakistan sent troops into Kashmir. The difference was that Pakistan lacked the military means to intervene in Junagadh, while India was able to send troops into Srinagar. The Junagadh nawab fled to Pakistan, whereas the Kashmir maharaja sat tight. India’s double standard on Junagadh and Kashmir was breathtaking.
Do you think the people of Junagadh would have integrated with Pakistan after six decades of genuine Pakistani effort? No? Then can you really be confident that Kashmiris will stop demanding freedom and integrate with India?
The British came to India uninvited. By contrast, Sheikh Abdullah, the most popular politician in Kashmir, supported accession to India subject to ratification by a plebiscite. But his heart lay in independence for Kashmir, and he soon began manoeuvering towards that end. He was jailed by Nehru, who then declared Kashmir’s accession was final and no longer required ratification by a plebiscite. The fact that Kashmir had a Muslim majority was held to be irrelevant, since India was a secular country empowering citizens through democracy.
Alas, democracy in Kashmir has been a farce for most of six decades. The rot began with Sheikh Abdullah in 1951: he rejected the nomination papers of almost all opponents, and so won 73 of the 75 seats unopposed! Nehru was complicit in this sabotage of democracy.
Subsequent state elections were also rigged in favour of leaders nominated by New Delhi. Only in 1977 was the first fair election held, and was won by the Sheikh. But he died after a few years, and rigging returned in the 1988 election. That sparked the separatist uprising which continues to gather strength today.
Many Indians point to long episodes of peace in the Valley and say the separatists are just a noisy minority. But the Raj also had long quiet periods between Gandhian agitations, which involved just a few lakhs of India’s 500 million people. One lakh people joined the Quit India movement of 1942, but 25 lakh others joined the British Indian army to fight for the Empire’s glory.
Blimps cited this as evidence that most Indians simply wanted jobs and a decent life. The Raj built the biggest railway and canal networks in the world. It said most Indians were satisfied with economic development, and that independence was demanded by a noisy minority. This is uncomfortably similar to the official Indian response to the Kashmiri demand for freedom.
Let me not exaggerate. Indian rule in Kashmir is not classical colonialism. India has pumped vast sums into Kashmir, not extracted revenue as the Raj did. Kashmir was among the poorest states during the Raj, but now has the lowest poverty rate in India. It enjoys wide civil rights that the Raj never gave. Some elections — 1977, 1983 and 2002 — were perfectly fair.
India has sought integration with Kashmir, not colonial rule. But Kashmiris nevertheless demand freedom. And ruling over those who resent it so strongly for so long is quasi-colonialism, regardless of our intentions.
We promised Kashmiris a plebiscite six decades ago. Let us hold one now, and give them three choices: independence, union with Pakistan, and union with India. Almost certainly the Valley will opt for independence. Jammu will opt to stay with India, and probably Ladakh too. Let Kashmiris decide the outcome, not the politicians and armies of India and Pakistan.—The Times of India
By Swaminathan S. Anklesaria Aiyar
Momentous decision
A BRITISH resident facing the death penalty at Guantanamo Bay has won his case for the government to disclose secret evidence that he says supports claims he was tortured into confessing to crimes he did not commit.
Binyam Mohamed, 30, who was arrested in Pakistan six years ago, says the Americans flew him to a prison in Morocco where he was tortured before his transfer to a US detention centre in Afghanistan.
In 2004, he was taken to the US Navy base in Cuba where he is awaiting a trial before a military commission on charges that he conspired with Al Qaeda leaders to plan terror attacks on civilians.
But this week the High Court in London said British authorities still held secret material that might help confirm Mr Mohamed’s whereabouts and the nature of his detention after 2002.
The judges said his allegations of torture were at least “arguable” and that the Security Service, MI5, had information relating to him that was “not only necessary but essential for his defence”.
In the ruling, the judges said the “conduct of the Security Service facilitated interviews by or on behalf of the US when Binyam Mohamed was being detained by the US incommunicado” in 2002 in Pakistan. Working with the Americans after the 9/11 terror attacks, the British authorities sent an officer from MI5 to interview him, the court said. The officer told him he could expect no help from Britain unless he fully cooperated with his US interrogators.
The court found that without the information held by MI5, Mr Mohamed would be unable to put up a defence to the charges against him at his US military tribunal. His lawyers yesterday described the ruling as a “a momentous decision”.
In 1994, Mr Mohamed, an Ethiopian by birth, was granted asylum in the UK.
— The Independent. London
Binyam Mohamed, 30, who was arrested in Pakistan six years ago, says the Americans flew him to a prison in Morocco where he was tortured before his transfer to a US detention centre in Afghanistan.
In 2004, he was taken to the US Navy base in Cuba where he is awaiting a trial before a military commission on charges that he conspired with Al Qaeda leaders to plan terror attacks on civilians.
But this week the High Court in London said British authorities still held secret material that might help confirm Mr Mohamed’s whereabouts and the nature of his detention after 2002.
The judges said his allegations of torture were at least “arguable” and that the Security Service, MI5, had information relating to him that was “not only necessary but essential for his defence”.
In the ruling, the judges said the “conduct of the Security Service facilitated interviews by or on behalf of the US when Binyam Mohamed was being detained by the US incommunicado” in 2002 in Pakistan. Working with the Americans after the 9/11 terror attacks, the British authorities sent an officer from MI5 to interview him, the court said. The officer told him he could expect no help from Britain unless he fully cooperated with his US interrogators.
The court found that without the information held by MI5, Mr Mohamed would be unable to put up a defence to the charges against him at his US military tribunal. His lawyers yesterday described the ruling as a “a momentous decision”.
In 1994, Mr Mohamed, an Ethiopian by birth, was granted asylum in the UK.
— The Independent. London
The eclipse of socialism
LOOKING back through August 2008 eyes, many commentators now seem to treat the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia 40 years ago this week as a primarily geopolitical event.
The coincidence of Russia’s invasion of Georgia and the anniversary of the invasion of 1968 perhaps makes it understandable that some should colour their thinking about the crushing of the Prague Spring this way. In this elision, securing their near-abroad against their empire’s enemies is what tsars in Moscow always do, whether the threat is from American capitalists or Georgian nationalists. The common theme, in other words, is always Russian power politics.
Undeniably there are important and ominous connections here — and they are ominous not only to those who live in any country in that vast geographic Russian border arc that stretches south from Finland to the Black Sea and then east from the Caucasus towards Mongolia.
No other state in the contemporary world treats its neighbours’ sovereignty with as much cynicism as Russia.
Yet to concentrate on the geopolitics of enduring Russian insecurity is to downplay some of the other large historical lessons of what happened in August 1968. That is because the central question in the eight months between the appointment of Alexander Dubcek as first secretary of the Czechoslovak communist party at the start of January 1968 and the overnight arrival of 500,000 Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops on August 21 of that year was big and simple. Could the Soviet communist model of socialism be reformed or not?
Today we know the answer. But the world of 1968 could not be so sure. The question was at the heart of the Prague Spring. Dubcek’s reforms raised the possibility that there could be some kind of democratic socialist third way.
The reform question was not being asked only in Czechoslovakia itself. It was also being posed to some degree in all the Soviet client states of eastern Europe, though manifestly under less open circumstances, as well as in limited.
The invasion of August 1968 put an end to all that. Even so, it took a while for the full implications of the invasion to sink in. As Zdenek Mlynar, a leading Czech reform Communist, later put it (as told by Judt), when Red Army troops burst in on a meeting of Dubcek’s politburo and lined up behind each member, the future of socialism was not the uppermost thought in most people’s minds. “But at the same time,” Mlynar went on, “you know that it has a direct connection of some sort with the automatic weapon pointing at your back.”
August 21, 1968 was not the day that communism died. But it was the day that communism’s death sentence was confirmed. Christopher Hitchens had a neat way of encapsulating the whole thing during a debate at the Hay literary festival earlier this year. If you flip 68 upside down, he said, you get 89. In eastern Europe the protest generation of 1968 was the generation who then replaced the Soviet system 21 years later. Dubcek himself, however, re-emerging in 1989 from long years of obscurity, was not part of it. Even in 1989 he remained wedded to the possibility of communist reform, even as communism was dissolving around him.
Yet August 1968 was also the beginning of a more general crisis for socialists of all kinds. Many in the western left in 1968 believed that Dubcek’s reform programme, though noble, was doomed.
The Soviet invasion duly confirmed their view. Yet however firmly the western left dissociated itself from Soviet communism’s own crisis, many on the left remained wedded in various ways to the same ideological — and in some cases the violent and lawless — traditions of the French revolution, out of which the Soviet Union had itself also been forged.
Forty years on from the Russian tanks, the eclipse of socialism is now as general in the West as it is in the former Soviet lands further east — perhaps even more so. Most people who consider themselves to be on the left — whatever that really means in the post-1989 world — are aware at some level of this reality.
Very few parties of the left have been equal to this task. In Britain in the 1990s, New Labour began to ask such questions, but not in a sustained way. Too many key, but hard, issues were ruled off the agenda.
— The Guardian, London
The coincidence of Russia’s invasion of Georgia and the anniversary of the invasion of 1968 perhaps makes it understandable that some should colour their thinking about the crushing of the Prague Spring this way. In this elision, securing their near-abroad against their empire’s enemies is what tsars in Moscow always do, whether the threat is from American capitalists or Georgian nationalists. The common theme, in other words, is always Russian power politics.
Undeniably there are important and ominous connections here — and they are ominous not only to those who live in any country in that vast geographic Russian border arc that stretches south from Finland to the Black Sea and then east from the Caucasus towards Mongolia.
No other state in the contemporary world treats its neighbours’ sovereignty with as much cynicism as Russia.
Yet to concentrate on the geopolitics of enduring Russian insecurity is to downplay some of the other large historical lessons of what happened in August 1968. That is because the central question in the eight months between the appointment of Alexander Dubcek as first secretary of the Czechoslovak communist party at the start of January 1968 and the overnight arrival of 500,000 Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops on August 21 of that year was big and simple. Could the Soviet communist model of socialism be reformed or not?
Today we know the answer. But the world of 1968 could not be so sure. The question was at the heart of the Prague Spring. Dubcek’s reforms raised the possibility that there could be some kind of democratic socialist third way.
The reform question was not being asked only in Czechoslovakia itself. It was also being posed to some degree in all the Soviet client states of eastern Europe, though manifestly under less open circumstances, as well as in limited.
The invasion of August 1968 put an end to all that. Even so, it took a while for the full implications of the invasion to sink in. As Zdenek Mlynar, a leading Czech reform Communist, later put it (as told by Judt), when Red Army troops burst in on a meeting of Dubcek’s politburo and lined up behind each member, the future of socialism was not the uppermost thought in most people’s minds. “But at the same time,” Mlynar went on, “you know that it has a direct connection of some sort with the automatic weapon pointing at your back.”
August 21, 1968 was not the day that communism died. But it was the day that communism’s death sentence was confirmed. Christopher Hitchens had a neat way of encapsulating the whole thing during a debate at the Hay literary festival earlier this year. If you flip 68 upside down, he said, you get 89. In eastern Europe the protest generation of 1968 was the generation who then replaced the Soviet system 21 years later. Dubcek himself, however, re-emerging in 1989 from long years of obscurity, was not part of it. Even in 1989 he remained wedded to the possibility of communist reform, even as communism was dissolving around him.
Yet August 1968 was also the beginning of a more general crisis for socialists of all kinds. Many in the western left in 1968 believed that Dubcek’s reform programme, though noble, was doomed.
The Soviet invasion duly confirmed their view. Yet however firmly the western left dissociated itself from Soviet communism’s own crisis, many on the left remained wedded in various ways to the same ideological — and in some cases the violent and lawless — traditions of the French revolution, out of which the Soviet Union had itself also been forged.
Forty years on from the Russian tanks, the eclipse of socialism is now as general in the West as it is in the former Soviet lands further east — perhaps even more so. Most people who consider themselves to be on the left — whatever that really means in the post-1989 world — are aware at some level of this reality.
Very few parties of the left have been equal to this task. In Britain in the 1990s, New Labour began to ask such questions, but not in a sustained way. Too many key, but hard, issues were ruled off the agenda.
— The Guardian, London
Our counter-terror strategy
OVER the last few years, Pakistan has been confronted with the ever increasing threat of insurgency. The latter is being fuelled by both state and non-state actors. The US coalition’s onslaught in Afghanistan being the rallying point is defeating the very purpose of Pakistan’s war on terror.
While alienating our own people, the very movement we created to fuel the Afghan jihad has come home to roost in ways which have found our army unprepared to take on the changing tactics of our foes.
While political will is sorely needed for any strategy to succeed in the long run, the on-and-off mode being employed to confront this insurgency is ruining any chances of a long-term political settlement.
Mao’s famous maxim, ‘there are no defined lines or fixed enemy’ in guerilla warfare holds good even today. The situation on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border today tends to confuse our strategists in fighting a war on our own turf and limits our own or US options in pursuing a common enemy across self-created fault lines. This weakness is obviously being exploited by the Taliban and Al Qaeda. The latter are exploiting Pakhtun nationalism to fuel a common strategy against the Pakistan Army and US-led coalition forces.
The other maxim of ‘securing the enemy’s firm base’, as a prelude to tactical manoeuvre, is also being ignored. Where is this firm base in the first place? Is it in Waziristan, Bajaur or Afghanistan? Confusing, yes, because that is the very purpose of the insurgent’s strategy: to keep shifting its firm base whenever there is a direct threat to it.
When the coalition troops directed their offensive against Al Qaeda and the Taliban at Tora Bora to eliminate the leadership of this movement, the leaders fled to Pakistan’s tribal areas. Within the tribal areas, they had the flexibility to concentrate to launch pre-emptive attacks against the security forces and then vanish into neighbouring regions to avoid annihilation and live to fight another day.
The forces being employed need to operate along unconventional lines from secure bases, with rapid reaction through aerial assault using special forces and backed up by long-range artillery and air defence. Failure provides the enemy with the initiative of ambush and isolation leading to defeat. We have repeatedly made the same mistakes and paid dearly for them.
What then should be the unifying strategy of the US and Pakistan security forces fighting this common enemy? The Pakistan Army’s aversion to any predator or missile strike into Pakistan territory to kill the Taliban is tactically defeatist in essence and strategically flawed in concept. The Pakistan Army not only lacks any worthwhile real-time surveillance capability to pursue multiple targets in these remote regions, it also lacks the means to destroy these through long-range precision weapons.
Should not, therefore, both sides of the border be treated as a common war zone to eliminate this threat? Whosoever presses the trigger is immaterial, as the enemy being elusive and fluid will vanish if not destroyed by the swiftest possible means which until today comprise Predator drones and the precision-strike capability of US artillery batteries.
Coordination in communications by both forces, surveillance using real-time download facilities and wireless employing common Nato procedures to swiftly call in strikes when the enemy is spotted no matter which side of the border he emerges would be the essence of success.
The fact that the killer round has come from across the border should not make us defensive in essence as long as there is a common strategy to eliminate the threat. Long-range special patrols to continuously track fleeing militants and pass them over to coalition forces waiting on the other side once they cross would be of great benefit. These special forces should have the inbuilt capability to pursue, communicate and guide weapon systems for precision strikes based upon updated intelligence reports.
The Pakistan Army’s strategy of eliminating this threat seems to be confused over the issue of maximum use of force using regular forces or using paramilitary forces as surrogates who neither have the will nor the means to destroy the enemy. This is not only prolonging the conflict, it also risks alienating the very populace we intend to defend because of the collateral damage and the militants’ terror policies.
The Pakistan Army is governed by its own rules of engagement under fire and should not get involved with local jirgas and elders as political agents are used to establishing their writ by evoking harsh penalties through collective punishments. Images of senior army commanders garlanding outlawed militants who have mercilessly slaughtered our soldiers is detrimental to the morale of the officers and men who are fighting and sacrificing themselves for ‘a cause not dear to their hearts’. The army should give a clear message that it will never negotiate with those who have slaughtered their comrades, and will pursue them till they have been eliminated.
Every insurgency has to be tackled according to the prevailing environment, its players and their supporters. The situation on the Pak-Afghan border has to be seen in the context of its present reality, not in the perspective of conventional thinking where the traditional enemy could be counted in terms of men, weapons, equipment and capabilities. Unfortunately for many, cold calculations of threat identification haven’t changed with the times.
Our reluctance to name countries and tribes and their surrogates who are fuelling this war against our very existence is strange if we claim that foreign fighters are actively involved. The ISPR has to be pro-active and not apologetic in its response, the lame excuse of passing the buck, is not only demeaning to the paramilitary forces, who are bearing the brunt of the casualties, but ultimately reflects a lack of will to act concertedly against the state’s enemies. The Pakistan Army has a proud tradition to uphold and vacillation and inept leadership will not do when addressing matters of critical national security.
Courtesy: Daily Dawn Lahore/ By Jahanzeb Raja
While alienating our own people, the very movement we created to fuel the Afghan jihad has come home to roost in ways which have found our army unprepared to take on the changing tactics of our foes.
While political will is sorely needed for any strategy to succeed in the long run, the on-and-off mode being employed to confront this insurgency is ruining any chances of a long-term political settlement.
Mao’s famous maxim, ‘there are no defined lines or fixed enemy’ in guerilla warfare holds good even today. The situation on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border today tends to confuse our strategists in fighting a war on our own turf and limits our own or US options in pursuing a common enemy across self-created fault lines. This weakness is obviously being exploited by the Taliban and Al Qaeda. The latter are exploiting Pakhtun nationalism to fuel a common strategy against the Pakistan Army and US-led coalition forces.
The other maxim of ‘securing the enemy’s firm base’, as a prelude to tactical manoeuvre, is also being ignored. Where is this firm base in the first place? Is it in Waziristan, Bajaur or Afghanistan? Confusing, yes, because that is the very purpose of the insurgent’s strategy: to keep shifting its firm base whenever there is a direct threat to it.
When the coalition troops directed their offensive against Al Qaeda and the Taliban at Tora Bora to eliminate the leadership of this movement, the leaders fled to Pakistan’s tribal areas. Within the tribal areas, they had the flexibility to concentrate to launch pre-emptive attacks against the security forces and then vanish into neighbouring regions to avoid annihilation and live to fight another day.
The forces being employed need to operate along unconventional lines from secure bases, with rapid reaction through aerial assault using special forces and backed up by long-range artillery and air defence. Failure provides the enemy with the initiative of ambush and isolation leading to defeat. We have repeatedly made the same mistakes and paid dearly for them.
What then should be the unifying strategy of the US and Pakistan security forces fighting this common enemy? The Pakistan Army’s aversion to any predator or missile strike into Pakistan territory to kill the Taliban is tactically defeatist in essence and strategically flawed in concept. The Pakistan Army not only lacks any worthwhile real-time surveillance capability to pursue multiple targets in these remote regions, it also lacks the means to destroy these through long-range precision weapons.
Should not, therefore, both sides of the border be treated as a common war zone to eliminate this threat? Whosoever presses the trigger is immaterial, as the enemy being elusive and fluid will vanish if not destroyed by the swiftest possible means which until today comprise Predator drones and the precision-strike capability of US artillery batteries.
Coordination in communications by both forces, surveillance using real-time download facilities and wireless employing common Nato procedures to swiftly call in strikes when the enemy is spotted no matter which side of the border he emerges would be the essence of success.
The fact that the killer round has come from across the border should not make us defensive in essence as long as there is a common strategy to eliminate the threat. Long-range special patrols to continuously track fleeing militants and pass them over to coalition forces waiting on the other side once they cross would be of great benefit. These special forces should have the inbuilt capability to pursue, communicate and guide weapon systems for precision strikes based upon updated intelligence reports.
The Pakistan Army’s strategy of eliminating this threat seems to be confused over the issue of maximum use of force using regular forces or using paramilitary forces as surrogates who neither have the will nor the means to destroy the enemy. This is not only prolonging the conflict, it also risks alienating the very populace we intend to defend because of the collateral damage and the militants’ terror policies.
The Pakistan Army is governed by its own rules of engagement under fire and should not get involved with local jirgas and elders as political agents are used to establishing their writ by evoking harsh penalties through collective punishments. Images of senior army commanders garlanding outlawed militants who have mercilessly slaughtered our soldiers is detrimental to the morale of the officers and men who are fighting and sacrificing themselves for ‘a cause not dear to their hearts’. The army should give a clear message that it will never negotiate with those who have slaughtered their comrades, and will pursue them till they have been eliminated.
Every insurgency has to be tackled according to the prevailing environment, its players and their supporters. The situation on the Pak-Afghan border has to be seen in the context of its present reality, not in the perspective of conventional thinking where the traditional enemy could be counted in terms of men, weapons, equipment and capabilities. Unfortunately for many, cold calculations of threat identification haven’t changed with the times.
Our reluctance to name countries and tribes and their surrogates who are fuelling this war against our very existence is strange if we claim that foreign fighters are actively involved. The ISPR has to be pro-active and not apologetic in its response, the lame excuse of passing the buck, is not only demeaning to the paramilitary forces, who are bearing the brunt of the casualties, but ultimately reflects a lack of will to act concertedly against the state’s enemies. The Pakistan Army has a proud tradition to uphold and vacillation and inept leadership will not do when addressing matters of critical national security.
Courtesy: Daily Dawn Lahore/ By Jahanzeb Raja
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